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Abstract
The collaborative consumption of an asset, such as a
car, an appliance, or a power tool, tends to degrade it
faster than when it is kept for purely personal use. This
paper examines the rational dynamic decision of when
to share an asset and when to use it only privately. An
optimal policy trades off additional degradation and resulting lifetime reduction against the additional revenue
from sharing. Solving the underlying continuous-time
optimal control problem, we characterize three possible
regimes: personal consumption, full sharing, and partial sharing. Collaborative consumption may be optimal
only at the beginning of the asset’s lifetime; the optimal
time to switch from sharing to pure private consumption
is obtained in closed form.

1.

Introduction

Electronic markets for collaborative consumption have
attained liquidity for assets that are intrinsically shareable. They have rendered the cost (including possible intermediary commissions) for sharing transactions small
relative to a borrower’s use value for the needed item,
such as a power tool or a car. Given an effective price
for sharing (net of transaction costs), we consider the
question of how the extra degradation of assets from collaborative use, over and above the degradation expected
from private use, determines individuals’ intertemporal
consumption and sharing decisions.

1.1.

Literature

The possibility of collaborative consumption [4, 5, 7]
helps decouple individuals’ incentives for owning assets from their (random) needs of using those same assets, clearing the path from an ownership-economy to
an access-economy [1, 3, 10]. Despite the archetypal
nature of sharing as a reciprocal activity which accompanied the development of mankind, electronic sharing
markets have come into existence only about a decade
ago. Reasons for this somewhat belated development include that only recently have intermediaries found ways
to resolve informational asymmetries and match potential sharing partners sufficiently well, so that the per-
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ceived costs for short-term sharing transactions would
not exceed the expected gains from trade. A key informational asymmetry in the context of sharing comes
from the moral hazard related to the unobservability of
the borrower’s actions, which may lead to a suboptimal
effort to exert sufficient care when using the lender’s asset. With the help of appropriate insurance contracts
a trusted intermediary can mitigate moral hazard, provided the parties are sufficiently risk-neutral [16]. Reputation systems [14] have an important additional role
to play by increasing the cost of borrower misbehavior
in terms of rating loss and the resulting decreased ability to become a trusted counterparty in future sharing
transactions. Here we ignore informational asymmetries and turn our attention to the fact that sharing an
asset tends to degrade it faster—even in the absence of
moral hazard—which has not yet been considered in the
literature. Virtually any product has a finite lifetime, due
to early failure, random failure, or wear and tear [2].
Our model uses a continuous-time approximation
for an agent’s dynamic consumption choice problem,
which can be investigated using an optimal control analysis framework [17]. Because of the inherently linear
structure of the relevant Hamiltonian in the control, the
solution exhibits bang-bang switching behavior, as in
the classical examples provided in the seminal text by
Pontryagin et al. [11]. Switching between known deterministic cash-flow (or utility) streams was recently considered by Weber [15] using global-optimization methods. In our context, classical optimal-control theory can
be used to obtain a closed form of the solution to the
agents’ switching problem, the solution of which is related to the classical Hotelling model for the extraction
of a nonrenewable resource, which in our context corresponds to product lifetime in the absence of maintenance investments (see footnote 3).

1.2.

Outline

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Sec. 2. introduces the model for an agent’s dynamic
sharing and personal-consumption decisions. Sec. 3.
establishes the dynamic-choice behavior by solving the
agent’s optimal control problem. In Sec. 4., we discuss
comparative statics of the solution. Sec. 5. concludes.
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2.

Model

the trivial case where renting the item out on a sharing
market is even better than using it when there is a need,
we assume—without loss of generality—that

We consider a single risk-neutral agent who owns a
shareable asset. At each moment in time t ≥ 0, the
agent needs the asset with probability θ ∈ [0, 1]. In
p < v.
other words, the agent’s random need states s̃t , with
realizations in {0, 1},1 are independent and identically At any time t, the agent would therefore share the item
only if there is no personal need for it. Hence, the
distributed according to
agent’s expected discounted value from sharing the asProb(s̃t = 1) = θ, t ≥ 0.
set when it is not needed, in the interval [0, TS ], can be
With this simplifying assumption we employ a written in the form
Z TS
continuous-time approximation, in the sense that while

e−rt (1 − θ)p + θv dt
US =
the length time for which the asset is needed is always
0
infinitesimally short, over any extended time interval

(1
− θ)p + θv
[t0 , t1 ) of nonzero measure (so 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < ∞), the
1 − e−rTS ,
=
r
aggregate time the agent would expect to need the asset
is θ(t1 −t0 ). When available for personal use the agent’s where TS is the (pure) sharing-lifetime of the asset.
instantaneous value of the asset at time t, conditional on
a positive need (st = 1), is V1 = v > 0. Without a need
for the asset (st = 0), the agent’s instantaneous value 2.3. Asset-Degradation Dynamics
for it is V0 = 0. The agent discounts future payoffs at
The asset’s lifetime depends on the nature of its use. The
the continuous discounting rate r > 0. In other words, a
current degradation of the asset at time t is represented
dollar arriving at time t > 0 is worth e−rt to the agent,
by the asset’s maintenance state x(t) with values in the
the discount thus reflecting the time-value of money.
state space X = [0, 1].3 We allow the agent to dynamically decide about participation in the sharing market at
2.1. Personal Use
time t, conditional on the maintenance state of the asset.
The agent therefore chooses the control variable u(t)
The agent’s expected discounted value from purely perwith values in the control-constraint set U = {0, 1},
sonal use over the interval [0, TP ] is
where u(t) = 0 indicates personal consumption (i.e., no
Z TP
sharing) and u(t) = 1 denotes collaborative consump
UP =
e−rt (1 − θ)V0 + θV1 dt
tion (i.e., sharing conditional on st = 0) at time t.
0
When in personal use the asset degrades at the con
θv
1 − e−rTP ,
=
stant rate λ > 0, while it degrades at the possibly eler
vated rate µ ≥ λ when it is not used by the owner.4 As a
where the asset is enjoyed over its personal- result, the asset-degradation dynamics are given by the
consumption lifetime TP . The smallest upper bound state equation
for the asset’s lifetime value in personal consumption is

the value of the perpetuity θv over the interval [0, ∞),
ẋ(t) = − (1 − θ)µu(t) + θλ x(t), x(0) = x0 ,
so UP ≤ θv/r.
for t ≥ 0. The positive initial state x0 is normalized
to 1, without any loss of generality (by a linear change
2.2. Collaborative Consumption
of units if necessary). Because the right-hand side of
We assume that there is a peer-to-peer sharing market, the preceding ordinary equation is always negative (takwhere the asset can be offered at the effective price p. ing into account the initial condition), the asset’s mainThis price includes any commissions charged by a shar- tenance state is strictly decreasing over time (see also
ing intermediary as well as transaction costs which may footnote 3). The asset is fully degraded as soon as it
arise when realizing the gains from collaborative con- reaches the discard threshold xd ∈ (0, 1). Hence, for
sumption.2 The agent is a price taker, and to exclude any admissible control u the agent might choose,5 the
1 At

time t ≥ 0, the agent has no need for the asset when st = 0 and a need for the asset when st = 1.
effective price can also include a less-than-perfect transaction probability as in Razeghian and Weber [13].
3 To avoid unnecessary complications we exclude the possibility of a costly maintenance intervention and refurbishment, which would
require additional assumptions about the cost and the effectiveness of such actions, distracting from our main concern, namely the dynamic
tradeoff between personal and collaborative consumption.
4 We focus here on wear and tear corresponding to the convex part of the classical “bathtub curve” for the hazard over the product lifecycle
(see, e.g., [9], p. 27), although in practice the hazard-rate dynamics may well be more complicated [8]. In our simple setting, the time of product
“failure” is perfectly known because the asset’s maintenance state x(t) attains the discard threshold xd at the deterministic time t = T .
5 By “admissible control” we mean a measurable mapping u : R → U .
+
2 The
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endogenous lifetime T of the asset is implicitly speci- optimal choice of the control variable can be characterfied by the terminal condition
ized by first determining the agent’s indifference on the
switching curve ν = σ(x), which satisfies the relation
x(T ) = xd .
H(x, 0, σ(x)) = H(q, 1, σ(x)),
Pure personal consumption and full asset sharing, described in Secs. 2.1 and 2.2, correspond to optimal conwhere
trols of u(t) ≡ 0 and u(t) ≡ 1, respectively. The enH(x, 0, σ(x)) = θv − σ(x)θλx
dogenous lifetime T is therefore bracketed by the lifetimes under these two extreme modes of consumption,
and
i.e.,
TS ≤ T ≤ TP ,
H(x, 1, σ(x)) = θv+(1−θ)p−σ(x) (θλ + (1 − θ)µ) x.
for any admissible control u the agent might choose.
Thus,

3.
3.1.

Dynamic Choice

σ(x) =

p
p
(≥
).
µx
µxd

Agent’s Control Problem

For ν ≥ σ(x) it is best to not share (u = 0), while
Given a dynamic choice u(t), for t ∈ [0, T ], the agent’s for ν ≤ σ(x) it is optimal to offer the item for sharing
expected discounted payoff is
(u = 1).
2. Adjoint equation. The adjoint equation provides
Z T
the law of motion for the adjoint variable ν:
Π(u, T ) =
e−rt (θp + (1 − θ)ϕu) dt.
0

The agent’s optimal control problem is therefore
Π(u, T ) −→ max ,
u(·),T

subject to
ẋ = − (θλ + (1 − θ)µu) x, x(0) = 1, x(T ) = xd ,
u(t) ∈ U, t ∈ [0, T ].
This corresponds to a Lagrange problem in the calculus
of variations, with endpoint constraint and free endtime,
to which a solution exists [6].

3.2.

Optimality Conditions

In order to solve the agent’s optimal control problem,
we first introduce the current-value Hamiltonian

ν̇ = rν − Hx (x, u, ν) = (r + θλ + (1 − θ)µu) ν.
Because of the state-endpoint constraint x(t) = xd , a
transversality condition for the endpoint ν(T ) of the adjoint variable is not available. From the preceding law of
motion (adjoint equation) it is clear that ν cannot change
sign, so that necessarily ν(0) > 0. In addition, we know
that ν(t) is exponentially increasing, thus leading to at
most a single switch in the owner’s sharing policy, from
u = 1 (use collaboratively) to u = 0 (use alone). The
initial arc, for u = 1, up to the switching time τ ∈ [0, T ]
is given by
ν(t) = ν(0) exp [(r + θλ + (1 − θ)µ) t] , t ∈ [0, τ ],
while the final arc beyond the switching time is
ν(t) = ν(τ ) exp [(r + θλ) (t − τ )] , t ∈ [τ, T ],

H(x, u, ν) = θv + (1 − θ)pu − ν (θλ + (1 − θ)µu) x,
where ν : [0, T ] → R denotes an (absolutely continuous) adjoint variable. The adjoint variable describes
the current value of the change in the maintenance state.
The Hamiltonian represents the current dynamic use
value of the asset (in collaborative and/or private consumption), including the value of the prevailing degradation momentum. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum
principle we obtain the following system of necessary
optimality conditions [11, 17].
1. Maximality. On an optimal state-control trajectory the Hamiltonian needs to be maximal with respect
to the control variable. Because H is linear in u, the

with
ν(τ ) = ν(0) exp [(r + θλ + (1 − θ)µ) τ ] .
A simplified description of the final arc is therefore
ν(t) = ν(0) exp [(1 − θ)µτ + (r + θλ) t] , t ∈ [τ, T ].
3. Endpoint optimality. Because the asset lifetime T is endogenous and subject to optimization,
it needs to satisfy the endpoint optimality condition
H(x(t), u(T ), ν(T )) = 0.
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3.2.3.

Regime PS: Partial Sharing

Consider now interior switching times τ ∈ (0, 1). Because of the monotonicity of the adjoint variable in the
preceding optimality conditions, several switches can
never be optimal. The operator therefore starts out offering the asset on the sharing market in off-times and at
some point takes it from the sharing market altogether.
By the definitions of the switching time and the switching curve σ, it is
p
µx(τ )
= ν(0) exp [(r + θλ + (1 − θ)µ) τ ] .

ν(τ )

= σ(x(τ )) =

The initial arc of the asset state is
x(t) = exp [− (θλ + (1 − θ)µ) t] , t ∈ [0, τ ],
Figure 1: Optimal degradation dynamics.
Depending on the problem parameters, there can be
three potentially optimal operating regimes: personal
consumption (P) corresponding to no sharing, full sharing (S), or partial sharing (PS); see Fig. 1.
3.2.1.

= x(τ ) exp [−θλ(t − τ )]

x(t)

which implies the longest possible optimal asset lifetime,
ln(1/xd )
TP =
.
θλ
The corresponding optimal payoff is
ΠP = Π(0, TP ) =

r 
θv 
1 − (xd ) θλ .
r

exp [−(1 − θ)µτ − θλt] , t ∈ [τ, T ],

=
with

x(τ ) = exp [− (θλ + (1 − θ)µ) τ ] .

Regime P: Personal Consumption

In the no-sharing regime, the optimal switching time
is τ ∗ = 0, i.e., u∗ (t) ≡ 0 is optimal for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Thus,
x(t) = xd = exp[−θλT ],

3.2.2.

while the final arc is given by

Hence, at the end of the horizon it is
xd = x(t) = exp [−(1 − θ)µτ − θλT ] ,
so
T

ln(1/xd ) − (1 − θ)µτ
 θλ   
1−θ
µ
= TP −
τ.
θ
λ
=

Furthermore, the endpoint optimality implies
0 = H(xd , 0, ν(T )) = θv − ν(T )θλxd ,

Regime S: Full Sharing

In the full-sharing regime, the optimal switching time is i.e.,
τ ∗ = T , i.e., u∗ (t) ≡ 1 is optimal for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Hence,
x(t) = xd = exp[−(θλ + (1 − θ)µ)T ],
which implies the shortest possible optimal asset lifetime,
TS =

ln(1/xd )
θλ TP
=
.
θλ + (1 − θ)µ
θλ + (1 − θ)µ

The corresponding optimal payoff is
i
r
θv + (1 − θ)p h
ΠS = Π(0, TS ) =
1 − (xd ) θλ+(1−θ)µ .
r

ν(T ) =

v
.
λxd

Using the earlier description of the final arc of the adjoint variable yields
ν(T )

=

v
= ν(0) exp [(1 − θ)µτ + (r + θλ) T ]
λxd

= ν(0) e

(r+θλ) ln(1/xd )−(1−θ)µrτ
θλ

.

Therefore

ν(0) =

v
λxd



e−

(r+θλ) ln(1/xd )−(1−θ)µrτ
θλ

.
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Taking into account the fact that ν(τ ) = σ(x(τ )), the In this we have used the fact that the time the asset is
preceding relation yields the switching time. For this, taken off the sharing market can be expressed in the
note that
compact form
(r+θλ) ln(1/xd )−(1−θ)µrτ
 
+(r+θλ+(1−θ)µ)τ
θλ
v e−
µv
1
∗
∗
ν(τ ) =
.
T − τ = ln
λ
xd
r
λp
(1−θ)µ
r
ve(1+ θλ ) ln(xd )+(θλ+(1−θ)µ+(1+ θλ )r)τ This “personal-use time” is positive if and only if
=
λxd
µ
p
r
v
θλ+(1−θ)µ+
(
(1+ (1−θ)µ
)r)τ
θλ
< .
=
· (xd ) θλ · e
v
λ
λ
and recall

Otherwise, the item is always offered for sharing during
its downtime so as to maximize its utilization.

x(τ ) = exp [− (θλ + (1 − θ)µ) τ ] ,
so

3.3.
 
p
exp [(θλ + (1 − θ)µ) τ ] .
σ(x(τ )) =
µ

In order to characterize the agent’s optimal dynamic
sharing policy we need to find conditions on the parameters for the relevance of regime P, S, or PS in the optimal solution. For this, we first compare the “boundary
regimes” (P and S) and then characterize the situations
where the “interior regime” (PS) is best for the decisionmaker.

We therefore obtain the optimality condition


− 1+ r ln
v e ( θλ )
p
=
µ
λ

1
xd



+(1+

(1−θ)µ
θλ

)rτ
,

xd

which yields the optimal switching time
 
 
λp
θλ
1
ln
+
ln
r
µv
xd
τ∗ =
θλ + (1 − θ)µ
 

λp
ln µv
θλ


TP +
=
θλ + (1 − θ)µ
r

 
1
µv
θλ
= TS −
ln
.
θλ + (1 − θ) µ r
λp

3.3.1.

does exceed
h
i
r
r
θv (xd ) θλ+(1−θ)µ − (xd ) θλ ,

And, the optimal payoff is given by:
 (1 − θ)p 

∗
∗
θv 
Π∗ =
1 − e−rT +
1 − e−rτ
r
r
θv + (1 − θ)p (θλ + (1 − θ)µ) p −rτ ∗
−
e
=
r
µr
θv + (1 − θ)p
=
− A,
r

(θλ + (1 − θ)µ) p
µr

(xd )r

µv
λp

i.e., if and only if the expected revenue from collaborative consumption exceeds the present value of the difference in usage value due to the shorter asset life induced
by offering it on the sharing market.
3.3.2.

Interior Regime: PS

We now examine the optimal switching time τ ∗ in
regime PS. This switching time is positive if

xd <

λp
µv

θλ/r
.

A sufficient condition is that the right-hand side of this
inequality exceeds 1, i.e.,
p
µ
> .
v
λ

where
A=

Boundary Regimes: P and S

Comparing regimes P and S, it is clear that full sharing
dominates personal consumption if and only if
i
h
r
(1 − θ)p 1 − (xd ) θλ+(1−θ)µ

Using the expression for the asset’s lifetime T as a function of the switching time τ , together with the relation
between TS and TP in Sec. 3.2.2., one therefore obtains
the optimal asset lifetime under partial sharing:
 i
h
θλTP + (1 − θ)µ 1r ln µv
λp
T∗ =
θλ + (1 − θ) µ

 
(1 − θ)µ
1
µv
= TS +
ln
.
θλ + (1 − θ) µ r
λp



Optimal Dynamic Sharing Policy

1
θλ ! θλ+(1−θ)µ

.

Thus, if the ratio of sharing price to usage value (p/v)
is larger than the ratio of asset degradation with sharing
to asset degradation without sharing (µ/λ), then sharing
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time τ ∗ is increasing in the discount rate r and the sharing price p. Hence, as agents become less concerned
about the future or the sharing market promises greater
economic rents, assets are used collaboratively for a
longer time. On the other hand, the switching time is
λp
decreasing in the discard threshold xd and the contingent consumption value v. This means that less durable
so that θ < θ̄ implies that sharing is optimal at least
goods get shared for less time, and—similarly—an ininitially.
crease in the asset’s need-contingent personal consumption value can only lead to less sharing. With respect to
3.3.3. Summary
the likelihood of need one obtains that τ ∗ is decreasing
The interior partial-sharing regime (PS) is optimal if and in θ if and only if −(θλ+(1−θ)µ)−(θ̄−θ)(λ−µ) < 0.
This in turn is equivalent to 0 < θ̄λ + (1 − θ̄)µ, which
only if
µ
p
is always satisfied. A larger personal utilization of the
<
and θ < θ̄.
asset leads to a shorter collaborative-consumption time.
v
λ
Regarding the effect of changes in the degradation
Finally, ΠP > ΠS if and only if
rates, consider first an increase in the sharing-related elθ (xd )r/(θλ+(1−θ)µ) − (xd )r/(θλ)
p
evated degradation constant µ. The switching time τ ∗
.
>
v
1−θ
1 − (xd )r/(θλ+(1−θ)µ)
decreases in µ if and only if
 
The policy regions are depicted in Fig. 2. Note that if the
µv
θ
(θλ
+
(1
−
θ)µ)
−
(1
−
θ)(
θ̄
−
θ)
ln
< 0,
−
own-degradation rate λ, the degradation threshold xd or
µ
λp
the ratio (µv)/(λp) are sufficiently small, the threshold
θ̄ exceeds 1, so θ ∈ [0, 1] can never exceed θ̄.
which is always satisfied in the interior of the
partial-sharing regime. Hence, an increase of the
degradation from collaborative consumption leads—
unsurprisingly—to a shorter time of sharing.
Finally, the monotonicity of the switching on the
“natural” degradation from renting is not definite, and
depends on the parameters. Indeed, τ ∗ is increasing in λ
if and only if


1
(θλ + (1 − θ)µ)    − 1 > (θ̄ − θ)λ.
ln µv
λp
will be optimal on some nontrivial time interval. Otherwise, there is a threshold
 
 r  ln x1
d
 ,
θ̄ =
λ ln µv

Figure 2: Agent’s optimal dynamic consumption policy.

For example, the inequality does not hold when p becomes small enough. In that case, the switching time
decreases in λ. The reason for the sign-ambiguity is that
λ is important both when the asset is shared and when it
is not shared.

4.2.

4.

Managerial Implications

To draw conclusions for managerial decisions, it is useful to examine the sensitivity of the rational sharing behavior to key parameters.

4.1.

Comparative Statics of τ ∗

Consider first the sensitivity of the optimal switching
time under partial sharing; the latter corresponds to the
time for which goods are rationally shared, thus minimizing the asset downtime. By straightforward differentiation one can show that the optimal switching

Comparative Statics of Π∗

Consider first the boundary regimes of personal consumption (P) and full sharing (S). One can show that
ΠP is increasing in θ/r and v, and that it is decreasing
in xd and λ. One can also show that ΠS is increasing
in v and p, and that it is decreasing in xd , r, µ, and λ.
The comparative statics of Π∗ are more complicated. It
is clear that it is decreasing in xd and decreasing in r.

4.3.

Comparative Statics of Lifetimes

Let ∆ = TP − TS be the diameter of the set of attainable lifetimes. Then ∆ is decreasing in xd , λ/µ, and θ.
Furthermore, because TP → ∞ as θ → 0+ while TP
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stays bounded, we also obtain that ∆ → ∞ as θ → 0+ .
This means that when personal utilization tends to zero,
the agent can make the asset last an arbitrarily long time
by withholding it from the peer-to-peer sharing market.

[5] B OTSMAN , R., ROGERS , R. (2010) What’s Mine
Is Yours: How Collaborative Consumption Is
Changing the Way We Live, HarperCollins, London, UK.

5.

[6] C ESARI , L. (1983) Optimization: Theory and Applications, Springer, New York, NY.

Conclusion

The economic optimality of sharing does not just depend on whether an item is idle at any given time. Our
analysis shows that the lifetime value of an asset is
generally not optimized by maximizing its utilization,
as it is sometimes suggested in the literature on sharing. Because increased utilization decreases its lifetime, the sharing price must be sufficiently large to justify collaborative consumption, even in the absence of
moral hazard. The second-order consequence of sharing markets is to influence product durability because
more highly used assets degrade faster.6 The solution
to the agent’s dynamic decision problem shows that
sharing is a beginning-of-life phenomenon: collaboratively used products are fairly new. This means that
at relatively low maintenance state of the product individuals may become reluctant to share, which therefore decreases the end-of-life utilization of assets. The
latter would be further compounded by impending replacement costs, which were not considered in this paper. Embedding the optimal sharing decisions into a
larger product-replacement problem remains an interesting topic for future research. In addition, there is a
set of activities concerned with extending the product
life (e.g., through refurbishments and repairs), which
deserves more detailed investigation in the context of
individuals’ asset-acquisition and use decisions.
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